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For the first time in American history, all nine Justices of the U.S. Supreme 
Court came to their positions directly from U.S. courts of appeals.  As new va-
cancies arise in the coming years, should the President continue to look to the 
circuits for Supreme Court nominees?  Commentators disagree on the answer.  
Those who support the current practice claim that the Senate is more likely to 
confirm nominees with judicial experience.  Proponents also argue that former 
federal judges are more likely to reach decisions based on precedent rather than 
on their own ideological values.  Those opposed to current practice point to the 
costs of elevating federal judges.  Among the most pernicious may be “circuit 
effects,” or the possibility that former U.S. courts of appeals judges are predis-
posed toward affirming decisions of the institutions they just left—their respec-
tive federal circuits.
We enter this debate not by rehashing the existing arguments, but by explor-
ing them empirically.  From our analyses, a clear conclusion emerges:  the 
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benefits of drawing Supreme Court Justices from the circuits are, at best, 
overstated, while the costs are, at a minimum, understated.  Indeed, the data 
reveal a strong predilection on the part of Justices with federal judicial experi-
ence to rule in favor of their respective home court.  For some, the attachment is 
so strong that they are twice as likely to affirm decisions coming from their for-
mer circuit as decisions coming from all others.  Even more striking is the ad-
vantage now enjoyed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia—the former home of four sitting Supreme Court Justices.
An obvious antidote is for the President to end the practice of appointing 
Supreme Court Justices from the circuits, and instead turn to the nation’s law 
schools, law firms, legislatures, executives, and state courts.  A less obvious, 
though no less plausible, remedy is for the President to select nominees from 
circuits underrepresented on the Court. 
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INTRODUCTION
After the appointments of John G. Roberts and Samuel A. Alito, 
commentators were quick to point to a new source of diversity on the 
U.S. Supreme Court:  religion.1  For the first time in the Court’s history,
Protestants do not hold a majority or plurality of seats; Catholics do.2
1
See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Why the Catholic Majority on the Supreme Court May Be 
Unconstitutional, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 173, 174 (2006) (arguing that Justices with ideo-
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But religion may be the exception.  On many other dimensions, 
the Roberts Court, as it is currently composed, is among the more 
homogeneous Courts in recent memory.3  Most noticeably, for the 
first time in American history all nine Justices came to their positions 
directly from U.S. courts of appeals.4
While this “professionalization” of the Court is without precedent, 
it has been long in coming.5  Ever since President Dwight D. Eisen-
hower made clear that he “would use an appeals court appointment as 
a stepping stone to the Supreme Court,”6 the vast majority of nomi-
nees have come from the federal circuits.7  Even more to the point, 
the Senate has not confirmed any Supreme Court nominee lacking 
circuit court experience since William H. Rehnquist in 1986.  Of 
course, there was President George W. Bush’s attempt in 2005 to ap-
logical or religious commitments devalue the importance of precedent in judicial 
decision making); Jake Tapper & Brooke Runnette, Alito Would Create Catholic Major-
ity on Top Court, ABC NEWS, Jan. 24, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/ 
SupremeCourt/story?id=1536354 (contrasting the historical and current public reac-
tions to Catholics in power); Robin Toner, The Supreme Court’s Catholic Majority, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 25, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/25/us/politics/26web-toner. 
html?_r=1&oref=slogin (discussing the complicated role that Catholicism has played in 
American politics). 
2
Detailed data on the Justices’ religious backgrounds is available in LEE EPSTEIN 
ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 280-90 (4th ed. 2007). 
3
Seven of the nine Justices are Republicans (all but Justices Stephen Breyer and 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg).  Only two of the nine (Justices Kennedy and Stevens) worked 
outside of the Northeast at the time of their appointment—a regional imbalance that 
would have been unthinkable in the Court’s early years.  See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, 
Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
443, 469 (1989) (arguing that “[g]eography preoccupied the founding generation” 
and influenced its decisions regarding the Supreme Court); Orrin G. Hatch, Save the 
Court from What?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1347, 1352 (1986) (book review) (noting that seats 
on the Court were “allocated according to geographical considerations”).  Finally, all 
but Justice Stevens attended law school at Harvard, Yale, or Columbia—an unprece-
dented nod to the Ivy League.  See Richard Cohen, Ivy-Covered Court, WASH. POST, Nov. 
15, 2005, at A21 (“You might think that the lock the Ivy League has on the Supreme 
Court is long-standing.  Not so.  This is a rather new phenomenon . . . .”).  Information 
on the Justices’ backgrounds, including their party affiliations, regional ties, and edu-
cation, is available in EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 271, 280, 291, 387-88. 
4
See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 352-53 (indicating the Justices’ positions at 
the time of nomination).  The Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, and Thomas 
served on the D.C. Circuit; Justices Breyer and Souter on the First; Justice Alito on the 
Third; Justice Stevens on the Seventh; and Justice Kennedy on the Ninth. 
5
Marcia Coyle, A Man Comfortable in “the Box,” NAT’L L.J., July 25, 2005, at 1, 19 
(quoting Sheldon Goldman). 
6
SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM 
ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 115 (1997). 
7
For data supporting this point, see infra Part I. 
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point his White House counsel, Harriet Miers.  Ironically enough, this 
nomination—so roundly criticized on the very ground that Miers had 
never served on the bench8—may have solidified the practice of look-
ing to the circuits for Supreme Court nominees.  As one observer 
noted, “[t]he appointments of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, 
and contrastingly the rejection of Harriet Miers, reinforce a trend on 
the Court that nominees not only have prior judicial experience, but 
also federal appellate experience.”9
As new vacancies are likely to arise on the Court in the not-so-
distant future, should the next presidential administration and the 
Senate continue to appoint Justices from the U.S. circuits?  Commen-
tators disagree on the best approach.10  Those who support this so-
8
See Anita F. Hill, Why Harriet Miers Mattered, MS., Winter 2006, at 19, 19 (“It’s cer-
tainly possible to criticize Miers’ qualifications for the Supreme Court without resort-
ing to sexism . . . .”); Robin Toner et al., Steady Erosion in Support Undercut Nomination,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at A16 (noting questions raised by senators about Miers’s 
“constitutional mastery”); Patrick J. Buchanan, Miers’ Qualifications Are Non-Existent, 
Oct. 3, 2005, http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=9444 (“[H]er qualifica-
tions for the Supreme Court are non-existent.  She is not a brilliant jurist, indeed, has 
never been a judge.”).  On the other hand, many commentators allege that conserva-
tives questioned her credentials because they were unsure of her ideological commit-
ments. See, e.g., Kevin P. Martin, Miers’s Qualifications, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 2005, at 
A19 (“Why . . . rush to dismiss Miers as a mere crony?  Mostly it is because conservatives 
have long had a dream list of nominees to the court . . . .”); Toner et al., supra (indicat-
ing Senator Sam Brownback’s view that “social conservatives were simply not inclined 
to go on faith that Ms. Miers was a reliable conservative”); Emily Bazelon, Let-Down 
Lady, SLATE, Oct. 3, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2127361/ (“The real fear on the 
right, of course, is that Miers will turn out to be another Justice David Souter, a re-
specter of precedent who lets her colleagues pull her to the center and then to the 
left.”).
9
Tuan Samahon, The Judicial Vesting Option:  Opting Out of Nomination and Advice 
and Consent, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 783, 815 (2006). 
10
For recent reviews of some of the many arguments both for and against the 
practice of elevating circuit court judges to the Supreme Court, see Vicki C. Jackson, 
Packages of Judicial Independence:  The Selection and Tenure of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J.
965, 983-84 (2007), who argues that looking to appellate courts for nominees provides 
the “opportunity to evaluate judicial temperament and craftsmanship through the 
nominee’s past judicial experience,” but “also create[s] undesirable incentives for de-
cisions made with an eye to advancement through necessarily political confirmation 
processes.”  See also Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Conse-
quences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903, 908 (2003) (“We 
argue that there now exists a norm of prior judicial experience that induces a highly 
problematic level of career homogeneity on the Court.”); Terri L. Peretti, Where Have 
All the Politicians Gone?  Recruiting for the Modern Supreme Court, 91 JUDICATURE 112, 112 
(2007) (discussing the change from a “statesmanlike” Court to a judicial one). 
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called “norm”11 of federal judicial experience point to any number of 
benefits.  Two such benefits appearing on many lists are less conten-
tious confirmation processes and, ultimately, superior products—
Justices who reach decisions based on precedent or other neutral 
sources, and not on their own political preferences.12  Those opposed 
to the norm do not necessarily dispute these benefits but instead ar-
gue that the costs are substantial.  They point to several disadvantages 
along these lines,13 perhaps one of the most pernicious being “circuit 
effects”—the possibility that federal-appellate-judges-turned -Supreme-
Court-Justices are predisposed to affirm decisions coming from the 
circuits they just left.14
In what follows, we weigh in on this debate, not by rehashing the 
existing arguments but rather by exploring them empirically.  After 
supplying a brief history of the norm of federal judicial experience, 
such as it is,15 we turn in Part II to its purported benefits and in Part 
III to its possible costs.  On balance, we find that the benefits are vir-
tually nonexistent—confirmation proceedings are no smoother for 
candidates coming from the circuits than for other nominees, and 
former appellate court judges are no more likely to follow precedent 
or to put aside their policy preferences than are Justices lacking judi-
cial experience.  The costs, on the other hand, are considerable.  
While we do not observe circuit effects in the form of Justices consis-
11
See Epstein et al., supra note 10, at 906 (calling the need for prior judicial ex-
perience a “norm”); Peretti, supra note 10, at 117 (agreeing that prior judicial experi-
ence is a norm, though writing that it is not “inviolable or universal”); see also Joel B. 
Grossman, Paths to the Bench:  Selecting Supreme Court Justices in a “Juristocratic” World, in
INSTITUTIONS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 142, 162 (Kermit L. 
Hall & Kevin T. McGuire eds., 2005) (deeming prior judicial experience “nearly a de 
facto qualification”). 
12
We describe and analyze these claims infra Part II. 
13
When he served as Chief Justice, William Rehnquist argued that professionaliza-
tion of the bench may lead to a decline in its independence and the respect it has al-
ways been afforded.  He bemoaned the fact that while at one time his Court housed 
the likes of Louis Brandeis, John Harlan, and Byron White—in other words, Justices 
“drawn from a wide diversity of professional backgrounds”—those days are long gone.  
See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 2001 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY,
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2001year-endreport.html (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2009).  Others have asserted that the Court’s “steady homogenization” 
has caused it to become “more reluctant” to hear and decide cases.  See, e.g., Stuart Tay-
lor, Jr., Comment, Remote Control, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2005, at 37, 37-38. 
14
See infra Part III (discussing data supporting the conclusion that appellate court 
judges promoted from below are more likely to affirm lower decisions).  It is worth 
noting that we know of no other empirical work on the Supreme Court along these 
lines and seek to fill this gap. 
15
See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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tently biased towards all the U.S. courts of appeals, the data do reveal 
a clear predisposition on the part of former federal judges to rule in 
favor of their home courts.  For some Justices the attachment is so 
strong that they are twice as likely to affirm decisions coming from the 
circuit on which they served than they are to affirm decisions coming 
from all other circuits.16
Under any circumstances, circuit effects seem problematic; they 
suggest that when the President and senators follow the norm of fed-
eral judicial experience, the Justices they appoint are more likely to 
give the benefit of the doubt to some circuits than to others.  But the 
problem of bias now transcends individual Justices.  Because four of 
the nine current Justices served on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia, the norm has created a collective presumption 
in favor of decisions handed down by the D.C. Circuit judges.  To pro-
vide but one example, while all other federal appellate court judges 
can expect the U.S. Supreme Court to reverse their decisions in about 
two out of every three disputes, those sitting on the D.C. Circuit actu-
ally enjoy a higher probability of being affirmed than reversed.17  Di-
luting this advantage, as we explain in Part IV, could take one of two 
forms:  occasionally abandoning the practice of appointing federal 
judges to the Supreme Court, or selecting nominees from the range 
of circuits so that no single circuit is disproportionately represented. 
I. THE ENTRENCHMENT OF THE NORM OF 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE
It is virtually indisputable that at least a practice, if not a norm,18
exists of appointing federal circuit court judges to the Supreme Court.  
As early as 1959 and as recently as 2008,19 commentators have ac-
knowledged the grave hesitation of the President and senators alike to 
16
For example, in cases coming to the Supreme Court from the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit, the predicted probability of Justice Stephen Breyer—a for-
mer judge on that court—casting a vote to affirm is 0.69; for cases coming from all 
other circuits, that figure is 0.29.  For more details on our analysis of Justice Breyer, 
along with all other Justices serving since 1953, see infra Part III. 
17
For the details on how we computed these figures, see the conclusion of this 
Article.
18
See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
19
See, e.g., Peretti, supra note 10, at 112 (noting the shift from appointing states-
men to the Supreme Court to selecting jurists); John R. Schmidhauser, The Justices of 
the Supreme Court:  A Collective Portrait, 3 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 1 (1959) (examining an 
earlier shift in criteria for selecting Supreme Court Justices from prior judicial experi-
ence to personal qualifications and character). 
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appoint anyone other than sitting judges, especially U.S. federal ap-
pellate court judges.  Given empirical evidence in support of this 
claim,20 it should be noted that of the sixty-two nominations made be-
tween 1869 (when Congress established the first separate judgeships 
for the U.S. circuits21) and 1952 (the last full year of the Truman ad-
ministration), just 16% went to federal circuit court judges; since the 
onset of the Eisenhower administration in 1953, that figure increased 
to nearly 66%.22
The demarcation of 1953 is no accident.  Almost all scholars who 
have studied the increasing presence of circuit court judges on the 
Court claim that the practice’s genesis lies in the 1950s, during the Ei-
senhower years,23 though disagreement arises over its origin.  Some 
suggest that the instigators were members of Congress, who, in the 
wake of Brown v. Board of Education24 and other controversial decisions, 
pressured Eisenhower to appoint members of the bench.  Sitting 
judges, the legislators claimed, would be more likely than politicians 
(such as Hugo Black or Earl Warren) or law professors (such as Felix 
Frankfurter)25 to respect precedent and to “base [their] decisions . . . 
upon ‘law,’ not ‘sociology.’”26  Several members of Congress went so 
far as to propose legislation requiring all future appointees to have at 
least five years’ judicial experience.27
20
See Epstein et al., supra note 10, at 909-17 (presenting empirical data in support 
of the claim that selection of Supreme Court Justice nominees from the appellate 
judge pool is now the norm). 
21
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at tbl.4-12; Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, § 2, 16 
Stat. 44 (1869).  Not until 1891 did Congress establish the U.S. Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals in the Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).  William B. Woods was 
the first U.S. circuit court judge nominated to the Supreme Court, in 1880. 
22 2 = 23.39 (p  0.05). 
23
See, e.g., Epstein et al., supra note 10, at 909 (claiming that the shift began as 
early as 1959); Peretti, supra note 10, at 114 (“Most commentators point to the 1950s as 
the origin of this new norm.”).  We adapt some of the material in this paragraph from 
the former. 
24
347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
25
Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Warren were all members of the Court that pro-
duced Brown.  Prior to their nomination to the Supreme Court, Black was a U.S. Sena-
tor, and Warren was Governor of California.  Frankfurter was a professor at Harvard 
Law School. 
26
Schmidhauser, supra note 19, at 41. 
27
For a review of the proposals, see Robert J. Steamer, Statesmanship or Craftsman-
ship:  Current Conflict over the Supreme Court, 11 W. POL. Q. 265, 270-71 (1958).  Peretti, 
supra note 10, at 117, writes that even today “Congress regularly considers requiring 
Supreme Court justices to have five or ten years of previous judicial experience.” 
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Other commentators point to President Eisenhower himself as the 
originator of the norm.28  They claim that after nominating Earl War-
ren as Chief Justice, Eisenhower deliberately “imposed” the criterion 
of judicial experience to distance himself from the overt “cronyism” 
that had characterized Franklin D. Roosevelt’s and, especially, Harry 
Truman’s approach to judicial selection.29
II. THE BENEFITS OF THE NORM OF PRIOR JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE
Whatever the origins of the practice of appointing federal judges 
to the Supreme Court, it is impossible to refute David Yalof’s claim 
that they are now the “darlings of the selection process.”30  But should 
they remain so?  To begin to address that question, we consider the 
purported advantages of adhering to the practice of promoting judges 
from the circuits:  a smoother confirmation process (Part II.A) result-
ing in superior Justices (Part II.B).  Part III explores the possible costs 
of continued adherence to the practice. 
A.  The Confirmation Process 
While analysts debate many features of the norm of federal judi-
cial experience, virtually all agree that its entrenchment can be traced 
at least in part to the confirmation process:  if Presidents want the 
Senate to confirm their nominees—as they invariably do—circuit 
judges are the safest bet.  Should the President nominate “somebody 
28
See GOLDMAN, supra note 6, at 115 (discussing Eisenhower’s selection of Jus-
tices). See generally DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLI-
TICS AND THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1999) (analyzing the Justice-
selection process as it becomes increasingly politicized). 
29
See GOLDMAN, supra note 6, at 115 (noting that Eisenhower’s criteria for choos-
ing Supreme Court Justices included an upper age limit, common sense, and lack of 
extreme viewpoint).  Indeed, Eisenhower apparently went so far as to make appellate 
court service a near prerequisite for service on the Supreme Court.  In his diary, Ei-
senhower recounted a conversation he had with Attorney General Brownwell about 
appointing Brownwell to the Supreme Court: 
I told Brownwell that if he had any ambitions to go on the Court, that we 
should appoint him immediately to the vacancy now existing on the Appellate 
Court in New York and then when and if another vacancy occurred on the 
Supreme Court, I could appoint him to it. 
Id. (citation and brackets omitted).  Brownwell turned down Eisenhower’s offer. 
30
YALOF, supra note 28, at 170 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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who does not have a strong record of judicial experience,” he may 
place himself and his candidate in a “vulnerable position.”31
Why?  Commentators offer three explanations:  (1) the public and 
politicians perceive federal appellate court judges as particularly well 
qualified for a seat on the Court; (2) organized interests are less likely 
to battle sitting federal judges; and, ultimately, (3) senators, even 
those who do not share the President’s political affiliation, are more 
likely to support candidates elevated from the circuits.  While each of 
these rationales seems plausible, none survives empirical scrutiny. 
1.  Qualifications 
Among the purported advantages of appointing appellate court 
judges, their qualifications for office often rise to the top of the list.  
The reason is straightforward:  because candidates with federal appel-
late court experience already have withstood the American Bar Asso-
ciation (ABA) vetting process, the President has an ex ante reason to 
believe that they will survive it again.  That is, sitting federal judges 
(e.g., Samuel Alito) start from a position of strength; until proven 
otherwise, they will be considered qualified.  Candidates lacking such 
experience (e.g., Harriet Miers) do not enjoy the same presumption.32
Such “benefit of the doubt” logic is important to the President for any 
number of reasons, not the least of which is that the Senate is far 
more likely to confirm a perceivably qualified candidate than one who 
is not perceived as such. 
While it is true that qualifications are important to a successful 
confirmation,33 the data fail to show that appellate court judges are 
perceived as more meritorious than other nominees.  Consider, first, 
the ABA’s ratings.  Since it began screening candidates in 1956, the 
ABA has handed down only five (out of twenty-eight) non-unanimous 
or otherwise problematic ratings:  to Potter Stewart, G. Harrold 
31
Mark Murray, Hillary on the Supreme Court?, MSNBC, May 23, 2008, http:// 
firstread.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2008/05/23/1057014.aspx (quoting David Yalof). 
32
See, e.g., Samahon, supra note 9, at 816 (“Federal appellate judges have previ-
ously survived ABA and FBI scrutiny during a prior confirmation.”); David A. Yalof, 
Dress Rehearsal Politics and the Case of Earmarked Judicial Nominees, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.
691 (2005) (discussing President George W. Bush’s conservative nominees and the dif-
ficulty of confirming them). 
33
See Lee Epstein et al., The Changing Dynamics of Senate Voting on Supreme Court 
Nominees, 68 J. POL. 296, 305 (2006) (“[W]hile ideological distance may ‘matter’ more 
than ever, professional merit continues to exert an important influence on senators’ 
votes.”).
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Carswell, William H. Rehnquist (in 1971), Robert Bork, and Clarence 
Thomas.34  Of the five, just Rehnquist lacked federal appellate court 
experience.  To put it another way, of the nine candidates nominated 
between 1956 and 2006 who had not served on a circuit, only 
Rehnquist received a mixed ranking, while four of the nineteen cir-
cuit judges were greeted with a less-than-enthusiastic reaction from 
the ABA.35
Consider yet another indicator of professional merit:  Segal and 
Cover’s qualifications scores,36 which the researchers derived by ana-
lyzing newspaper editorials written between the time of the Presi-
dent’s nomination and the Senate’s vote.37 Unlike the ABA rating,38
34
Stewart received a rating of exceptionally well-qualified by a ten-to-one vote; 
Carswell, a unanimous rating of qualified; Rehnquist, a rating of qualified, with nine 
members voting that he was well qualified and three not opposed; Bork received ten 
votes of well-qualified, one not opposed, and four not qualified; and Thomas received 
a rating of qualified by a divided vote (twelve voted qualified, two not qualified, and 
one recusal).  EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 389-90. 
35
The difference is not statistically significant (p  0.05). 
36
Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 559 (1989); see also Charles M. Cameron et al., 
Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees:  A Neoinstitutional Model, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
525 (1990) (using a statistical model to estimate Senate confirmation votes based on 
electorally attractive positions).  The updated scores are available on Segal’s website.  
See Perceived Qualifications and Ideology of Supreme Court Nominees, 1937–2005, 
http://www.sunysb.edu/polsci/jsegal/qualtable.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2009). 
37
More specifically, Segal and Cover identified every editorial in four leading 
newspapers that offered an opinion on a candidate’s qualifications.  With the editorials 
in hand, Segal and Cover evaluated their content on the basis of claims about the 
nominee’s acceptability from a professional standpoint.  For example, the following, 
which appeared in the New York Times, would be evaluated as a negative statement 
about Clarence Thomas’s credentials:  “Believe him or not, nothing in this bizarre epi-
sode enhances Judge Thomas’s qualifications, which were slim to start. . . . If Judge 
Thomas were a brilliant jurist, a Holmes or a Brandeis, the gamble might be justified. 
But Clarence Thomas offers no such brilliance . . . .”  Editorial, Against Clarence Thomas:  
Even “Don’t Know” Calls for a “No” Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1991, at A24.  On the other 
hand, this sentence, also appearing in the generally liberal New York Times, would be 
counted as a positive claim about Antonin Scalia’s and William Rehnquist’s qualifica-
tions:  “Even liberal critics acknowledge the impressive legal credentials of the Su-
preme Court nominees.  Justice Rehnquist was first in his Stanford Law School class; 
Judge Scalia was a Harvard Law Review editor; both have written scholarly articles and 
learned, if combative, judicial opinions.”  Editorial, Presidential Insults:  On Manion, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 1986, at A26.  After analyzing all of the editorials, Segal and Cover cre-
ated a scale of the lack of qualifications for each nominee that ranges from 0 (most 
qualified) to 1 (least qualified).  Segal & Cover, supra note 36, at 562 fig.1. 
38
Several analysts have accused the ABA of a liberal ideological bias in its rank-
ings. See, e.g., James Lindgren, Examining the American Bar Association’s Ratings of Nomi-
nees to the U.S. Courts of Appeals for Political Bias, 1989–2000, 17 J.L. & POL. 1, 28 (2001) 
(“For those without prior judicial experience, just having been nominated by Clinton 
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this measure contains no biases—ideological or otherwise—and so is 
frequently invoked by scholars systematically studying appointments to 
the Court.39  Nonetheless, it provides no more support for the re-
ceived wisdom about the higher qualifications of circuit judges than 
do ABA ratings. 
We highlight this point in Figure 1, which depicts the Segal-Cover 
score for each nominee since 1937.  Sitting appellate court judges are 
in the right panel; all others are in the left.  Note that in both panels 
we observe a large fraction of highly qualified candidates:  Justices 
Ginsburg and Scalia among the former circuit judges and Justices For-
tas and Frankfurter among those taking other career paths.  Fewer 
candidates were perceived as extremely unqualified—Judges Carswell 
and Haynsworth in the left panel, and Tom Clark and Hugo Black in 
the right—but no major imbalances seem to exist between the circuit 
court judges and the others.  That is, the former appellate judges do 
not appear to be perceived as any more (or less) qualified than those 
selected from other occupations.  Nominees with federal judicial ex-
perience are in the right panel; nominees who never served as a fed-
eral appellate court judge are in the left.40
Statistics confirm this visual impression.  On a scale of 0 (ex-
tremely qualified) to 1 (extremely unqualified), the mean for the 
twenty-three nominees without federal judicial experience is 0.24; for 
the twenty former appellate court judges it is 0.26—a difference both 
substantively and statistically trivial.41
instead of Bush is a stronger positive variable [for earning an ABA ‘Well Qualified’ rat-
ing] than any other credential or than all other credentials put together.”). 
39
See, e.g., Epstein et al., supra note 33, at 297 (stating that the Segal-Cover calcula-
tion “figure[s] prominently into many (if not most) essays” on the topic). 
40
We include Thurgood Marshall, who had served as a federal appellate court 
judge, but was Solicitor General at the time of his appointment.  The results are the 
same if we exclude him or do not treat him as a former circuit court judge. 
41
The standard deviations are, respectively, 0.27 and 0.29.  (t = 0.2943, p = 0.77). 
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Figure 1:  The Perceived Qualifications of Nominees to the  
Supreme Court, from Hugo Black (1937)  
Through Samuel Alito (2006) 
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Note:  Nominations are ordered from most to least qualified.   
2.  Organized Interests 
Higher qualifications are not the only professed advantage of ele-
vating federal appellate court judges.  Another centers on organized 
interests:  because interest groups can complicate and even derail Su-
preme Court appointments, the President prefers nominees who are 
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less likely to draw the attention of those groups—and those nominees, 
analysts contend, are almost always life-tenured federal judges.42
Unlike, say, public officials who must take stands on the contentious 
issues of the day, U.S. circuit judges are able to “chart a course of 
moderation on policy issues.”43  Even when they must cast a vote over 
a controversial dispute, circuit judges can almost always claim that 
their decision followed Supreme Court precedent or some other 
“neutral” principle.44  As a result, federal court judges are less attrac-
tive targets for interest groups, if only because the groups would have 
to “expend considerable resources trying to turn a federal appeals 
judge into a political lightning rod during the confirmation proc-
ess.”45
While many observers have advanced this hypothesis, once again 
the data fail to substantiate it, as Figure 2 makes clear.  There we show 
the fraction of interest groups testifying against each nominee among 
all groups testifying.  The former circuit court judges appear in the 
right panel; all others are in the left. 
42
See, e.g., YALOF, supra note 28, at 171. 
43
Id.
44
For example, when asked by Senator Kohl about his dissent in Planned Parent-
hood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 720-25 (3d Cir. 1991) (Alito, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part), in which he argued that the requirement 
that a woman notify her husband prior to obtaining an abortion did not impose an 
undue burden upon a woman, Samuel Alito responded: 
Trying to apply the undue burden test at that time to the provisions of the 
Pennsylvania statute that were before the court in Casey was extremely diffi-
cult, and I can really remember wrestling with the problem and I took it very 
seriously and I mentioned that in my opinion and it presented some really dif-
ficult issues.  Part of the problem was that the law just was not very clear at that 
time.
 The undue burden standard had been articulated by Justice O’Connor in 
several of her own opinions and there were just a few hints in those opinions 
about what she meant by it. 
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
382-83 (2006) (statement of then-Judge Samuel Alito). 
45
YALOF, supra note 28, at 171. 
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Figure 2:  The Fraction of Interest Groups Testifying Against  
Nominees to the Supreme Court, from Earl Warren (1953)  
Through Samuel Alito (2006)
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Note:  In the right panel are nominees with federal judicial ex-
perience; in the left panel are nominees who never served as a 
federal appellate court judge. 
Overall, organized interests paid scant attention to most modern-
day nominations:  across all thirty-one, the median number of groups 
testifying in support or opposition is just six.  This is not terribly sur-
prising given that presidents attempt to select candidates with an eye 
toward minimizing controversies.  More surprising, in light of claims 
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to the contrary,46 is that when it comes to groups testifying in opposi-
tion, no major differences emerge between the former judges and 
those taking a different career path, as Figure 2 suggests. 
Actually, the average fraction of groups testifying against a nomi-
nee who is an appellate judge (0.51) is nearly identical to the average 
fraction of groups testifying against all other nominees (0.52).47
3.  Senators 
While former appellate court judges are no more or less likely to 
attract the attention of organized interests and are perceived as no 
more or less qualified for office, it still remains possible that the Sen-
ate is more likely to confirm them.  As Yalof reminds us, unlike most 
other candidates, all federal appellate court judges 
boast of the experience of having successfully survived Senate Judiciary 
Committee scrutiny at least once before.  Most appeals court judges also 
maintain crucial ties with senators, the same individuals who originally 
supported them for appointment to their current judicial positions; 
those senators now become ready-made political patrons available to 
help shepherd them through the often torturous Supreme Court con-
firmation process.
48
Past success in the Senate, of course, “permits the political rheto-
ric that, in view of the Senate’s prior confirmation, no good reason 
now exists to oppose the nominee.”49  But more than that, a previous 
successful confirmation—coupled with higher qualifications and less 
organized opposition—is more likely to result in future success. 
This may be a long-standing piece of conventional wisdom but, yet 
again, the data simply do not support the belief.  As a descriptive mat-
ter, since the establishment of separate judgeships for the circuits in 
1869, Presidents have made ninety-four nominations to the Supreme 
Court.  Of the ninety-four, about one third (n = 31) had served as fed-
eral appellate court judge and two-thirds had not (n = 63).50  The dif-
46
See, e.g., id. (suggesting that circuit court judges are preferable to other profes-
sions due to their moderate positions on policy issues). 
47
The difference is not statistically significant (t = 0.02; p = 0.98).  Again, we in-
clude Thurgood Marshall who had served as a federal appellate court judge but was 
Solicitor General at the time of his appointment.  The substantive results are the same 
if we exclude him (t = 0.55; p = 0.59). 
48
Yalof, supra note 32, at 697. 
49
Samahon, supra note 9, at 816. 
50
Again, we include Thurgood Marshall as an appellate court judge.  The results 
are the same if we exclude him. 
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ference in confirmation success (77.8% for the judges and 77.4% for 
the others) is statistically indistinguishable.51  Simply put, for every 
Robert Bork, there was a Harriet Miers; and for every Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, there was a Lewis Powell. 
More systematic analyses, however, do demonstrate a significant 
relationship between confirmation success and service on a U.S. court 
of appeals, but one that works in precisely the opposite direction of 
the conventional view:  the President actually has a tougher time with 
senators when he nominates a circuit court judge. 
This much we learned from reestimating a standard statistical 
model that seeks to explain senators’ voting over all Supreme Court 
nominees from Hugo Black in 1937 through Samuel Alito in 2006.  
Developed by Cameron, Cover, and Segal, the model takes into ac-
count the nominees’ perceived qualifications and their ideology rela-
tive to each senator, as well as whether the President’s party controlled 
the Senate and whether the senator and President were of the same 
party.52  As Cameron and his colleagues have demonstrated, each of 
these factors exerts a significant influence on the senators’ votes.53
What they have not assessed is whether the nominee’s career ex-
perience also affects Senate votes.  We take this step here by incorpo-
rating into their statistical model a variable indicating whether the 
candidate had served on a U.S. court of appeals. 
As Table 1 shows, the results could not be clearer.  In direct con-
tradistinction to the conventional view, senators are statistically less 
likely to vote for circuit court judges than all other types of nominees.54
Not only is the estimate of the variable “Experience as Federal Appel-
late Judge” negatively signed (indicating an inverse relationship be-
tween a yea vote and service as a circuit court judge) and statistically 
significant, it is also substantively important. 
51
The same holds whether we consider confirmations before or after 1953.  Of 
the 62 nominees prior to 1953, 76.9% of those who lacked service on the circuits were 
confirmed; that figure for the appellate court judges was 90.0%.  After 1953, the Sen-
ate confirmed 71.4% (15 out of 21) of the judges and 81.8% (9 out of 11) of the non-
judges.  In neither period is the difference statistically significant. 
52
Cameron et al., supra note 36, at 528-29; see also Epstein et al., supra note 33, at 
298 (describing the model’s variables). 
53
See Cameron et al., supra note 36, at 530-31 (“Overwhelmingly . . . it is the inter-
action of qualifications and ideology that determines the votes of Senators.”). 
54
This analysis codes Thurgood Marshall as an appellate court judge.  The results 
are substantively and statistically identical if we treat him as a nonfederal judge. 
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Table 1:  Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees,  
from Hugo Black (1937) to Samuel Alito (2006) 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Experience as Federal  
Appellate Judge 
-1.04* 0.15
Senator and President of 
Same Party 
1.33* 0.16
Strong President 0.65* 0.15
Lack of Qualifications -4.18* 0.23
Ideological Distance -4.15* 0.25
Constant 4.25* 0.22
N = 3809 
Log-likelihood = -885.92 
2
(5) = 612.77 
Note:  Cell entries are logit coefficients and robust standard  
errors.  * indicates p  0.05.55
Figure 3 vividly illustrates this last point.  There we show the pre-
dicted probability of a senator casting a yea vote for a Supreme Court 
nominee who does and does not have experience as a federal appel-
late court judge.  For purposes of presentation, we draw the compari-
son by the extent to which each candidate was perceived as qualified 
(at the left end of the graph) or not (at the right end of the graph). 
55
The standard errors in this table are very likely too small since the implicit as-
sumption that the confirmation votes are independent of one another given the co-
variates seems unlikely to hold.  We simply note this fact rather than attempting a 
complicated correction because the main purpose of the table is to summarize the ob-
served data and not to test formal hypotheses. 
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Figure 3:  The Effect of Federal Appellate Court Judge Status on  
Senate Voting over Supreme Court Nominees, from  
Hugo Black (1937) Through Samuel Alito (2006) 
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Note:  This figure shows the predicted probability of a senator 
casting a yea vote for nominees who served as a federal appellate 
court judge and those who had not, over the range of their per-
ceived qualifications (0 indicates most qualified and 1 indicates 
least qualified) based on the model in Table 1.  The vertical lines 
are 95% confidence intervals.  All other variables (see Table 1) are 
set at their means or modes.56
At no point on the above figure is the dashed line (indicating fed-
eral appellate court judges) above the solid line (indicating non-
judges).  This tells us that the odds of a senator casting a yea vote for 
an appellate court judge are significantly lower than for other candi-
dates, regardless of the nominee’s merit.  To be sure, at some levels of 
qualification the difference is trivial—for highly qualified judges, for 
example, the probability of a yea vote is 0.91 and for highly qualified 
nonjudges it is 0.97.57  But as we move away from the most qualified 
56
We generated this figure via SPost.  See generally J. SCOTT LONG & JEREMY FREESE,
REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL DEPENDENT VARIABLES USING STATA (2d ed. 
2006).
57
The 95% confidence intervals are, respectively, [0.89, 0.93] and [0.96, 0.98]. 
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candidates the difference becomes more meaningful.  When a candi-
date is perceived as only moderately qualified, the odds of a successful 
confirmation for a nonjudge remain high (0.79), but for judges they 
actually fall uncomfortably close to the 0.50 mark (0.57).58  It is worth 
noting that our results do not depend on Robert Bork.  Removing 
him from the analysis still produces a statistically significant coefficient 
on the variable indicating whether a nominee served as a circuit court 
judge, and the other variables remain equally unaffected. 
Taken collectively, these results seem quite surprising in light of 
conventional views about the ease of confirming federal appellate 
court judges.  They strongly suggest that the received wisdom is a 
myth—in this case a myth likely perpetuated for five reasons:  Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  All were sitting appel-
late court judges at the time of their nomination, and the Senate con-
firmed all by very wide margins.59  Nonetheless, we can point to other 
members of the federal bench who faced substantial obstacles in their 
quest to obtain a seat on the Court.  Indeed, five of the eight highly 
contentious nominations since 1937 were federal appellate judges.60
Clement Haynsworth, G. Harrold Carswell, and Robert Bork were all 
sitting judges at the time of their rejection; Clarence Thomas and 
Samuel Alito, though confirmed, escaped defeat by ten or fewer 
votes.61  Only Abe Fortas (for Chief Justice) and William Rehnquist 
(for both nominations)—neither a former appellate court judge—
generated as much controversy.62
B.  The Products of the Confirmation Process 
A smoother appointment process is not the only reason presidents 
and other policymakers have offered for instantiating a practice of 
promoting from within the federal courts.  The other explanation 
strikes at the very nature of judging:  appellate court judges are more 
likely to have developed the appropriate judicial temperament and, as 
58
The 95% confidence intervals are, respectively, [0.73, 0.84] and [0.51, 0.62]. 
59
Justice Scalia was confirmed by a vote of 98-0; Justice Kennedy, 97-0; Justice 
Souter, 90-9; Justice Ginsburg, 96-3; and Justice Breyer, 87-9.  EPSTEIN ET AL., supra
note 2, at 387-88 tbl.4-15. 
60
By contentious nomination, we mean a nomination garnering twenty-five or 
more nay votes. 
61
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 387 tbl.4-15. 
62
Id.
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a result, will be superior Justices.63  The idea here is that prior judicial 
experience neutralizes even the most partisan and ideological of law-
yers, forcing them to become more respectful of the organizational 
constraints that they confront, such as respect for precedent and the 
need for fair and neutral arbitration. 
Certainly, many politicians have deployed this argument for stra-
tegic purposes.  After Brown v. Board of Education, southern legisla-
tors proposed requiring judicial experience for membership on the 
Court.64  During George W. Bush’s presidency, it was Democrats who 
objected to particular nominees on the basis of their lack of prior ser-
vice on the bench.  It seems doubtful that many of those same Democ-
rats also believed “that Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice Hugo Black, 
and even Chief Justice Marshall were somehow lacking because they 
had not been involved in politics and had no prior judicial experi-
ence.”65  Then there is Harriet Miers.  More than a few observers al-
lege that it was conservative Republicans who flagged her lack of judi-
cial experience, not because the void in her resume deeply troubled 
them, but “because they were insufficiently confident she would sup-
port their extreme agenda.”66
Even so, the belief that judicial experience makes for better Su-
preme Court Justices—whether because they are more likely to re-
spect precedent or be more neutral in their decision making—
remains quite widespread.  Look no further than Samuel Alito’s con-
firmation proceedings.  Senators filled the public record with com-
ments echoing themes initially developed by President Bush,67 noting 
63
This argument also occasionally arises in the context of lower court 
nominations.  For example, in considering Jerome A. Holmes’s nomination for the 
Tenth Circuit, Senator Feingold proclaimed, 
President Bush originally nominated Mr. Holmes to be a Federal district judge 
in Oklahoma earlier this year. 
 . . . . 
 But for some reason Mr. Holmes’ nomination was upgraded to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.  Placing a nominee with no judicial 
experience on an appellate court makes it hard to evaluate the nominee’s 
judicial temperament—his capacity to be fair and impartial. 
152 CONG. REC. S8149 (daily ed. July 25, 2006) (statement of Sen. Feingold). 
64
For a list of proposals and their sponsors, see Steamer, supra note 27, at 270-71. 
65
152 CONG. REC. S5200 (daily ed. May 25, 2006) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
66
Id. S347 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 2006) (statement of Sen. Reid); see also supra note 8 
(citing media references to Miers’s lack of experience). 
67
When he nominated Samuel Alito, the President emphasized Alito’s prior 
judicial experience. See Remarks Announcing the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., 
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that “[Alito] has more judicial experience than any Supreme Court 
nominee in 70 years,”68 and that “[o]f the 109 men and women who 
have been chosen to serve this country on the Supreme Court, Judge 
Alito has spent more time on the Federal bench than all but four,”69
and so on.  Whether the senators thought Alito’s experience was valu-
able is less the heart of the matter than their belief that their constitu-
ents would regard it as a plus. 
Moreover, seemingly neutral scholars have advanced similar 
claims.  Legal historian Kermit Hall defended the practice of promot-
ing judges from the circuits on the ground that “having heard appeals 
court arguments and decided cases gives you a better way of sorting 
through what the meaning of the law is.”70  Even more important, Hall 
said, is that “[t]he life course of a judge makes a difference.”71  Along 
similar lines, Stephen Carter declared that “a number of observers (I 
am among them) have argued that seats on the Court should be re-
served for those who have spent many years as appellate court 
judges.”72
In what follows, we take seriously claims about the importance of 
federal judicial experience by empirically examining its three chief 
underpinnings:  that circuit court judges will be more respectful of 
the organizational expectations of (1) stare decisis and (2) neutrality, 
and, (3) ultimately make for more influential, even great, Justices.  
Once again, the data fail to support any of these three contentions. 
1.  Respect for Precedent
A common theme among those advocating a norm of prior judi-
cial experience centers on precedent—specifically, the tendency to 
“equate abandonment of stare decisis . . . as behaviour typical of those 
justices who were not properly conditioned for high judicial office.”73
As one Senator explained, “the process of judicial seasoning and judi-
to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 44 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. DOC 1625 (Oct. 31, 2005). 
68
152 CONG. REC. S92 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2006) (statement of Sen. Allard). 
69
Id.  S197 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 2006) (statement of Sen. Dole). 
70
David E. Rosenbaum, If Approved, a First-Time Judge, Yes, but Hardly the First in 
Court’s History, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2005, at A24. 
71
Id.
72
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL 
APPOINTMENT PROCESS 161 (1994). 
73
John R. Schmidhauser, Stare Decisis, Dissent, and the Background of the Justices of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, 14 U. TORONTO L.J. 194, 204 (1962). 
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cial experience . . . is almost the only way to make an outstanding ju-
rist who is wedded to the system of precedents.”74  Most other types of 
nominees, including “legislators and schoolmen,” according to a for-
mer president of the ABA, are “least influenced” by stare decisis.75
No doubt a perception exists “that prior judicial experience 
makes a justice more deferential to precedent,”76 but one of the few 
systematic studies on the matter provides, if anything, evidence to the 
contrary.  Writing in 1962, John R. Schmidhauser demonstrated “a 
higher proportion . . . of the justices possessing significant prior judi-
cial experience showed a strong propensity to abandon stare decisis 
than did the justices lacking such experience.”77  He went on to con-
clude that “the distributions consistently support the hypothesis that 
significant prior judicial experience is inversely related to strict adher-
ence to precedent.”78
Our analyses of both the Court and the individual Justices are 
more consistent with Schmidhauser’s argument than that of advocates 
of judicial experience.  Looking first at the institution collectively, we 
find no relationship between its general propensity to follow stare de-
cisis and the number of former circuit court judges—that is, the Court 
is no more or less likely to override its past decisions as the total num-
ber of former circuit court judges increases.79
If we consider cases in which the Court overruled precedent, 
however, an association emerges, and this may be what Schmidhauser 
detected:  as more appellate court judges have joined the Court, the 
majority has grown more and more likely to overturn a particular type 
74
102 CONG. REC. 7277 (1956) (statement of Sen. Stennis). 
75
Walter P. Armstrong, Mr. Justice Douglas on Stare Decisis:  A Condensation of the 
Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 35 A.B.A. J. 541, 543 (1949). 
76
William G. Ross, The Ratings Game:  Factors that Influence Judicial Reputation,
79 MARQ. L. REV. 401, 420 (1996). 
77
Schmidhauser, supra note 73, at 202. 
78
Id.
79
We estimated a logistic regression in which the outcome variable was whether 
the Supreme Court overturned one of its own precedents and the number of former 
federal appellate court judges was entered as a covariate.  The coefficient on the num-
ber of former judges was not statistically significant (p = 0.83).  As a check on the 
analysis, we also considered whether the Court was less likely to overturn precedent as 
the number of all former judges (state and federal) increased.  Again, the coefficient 
was not statistically significant (p = 0.86).  Data are from Harold J. Spaeth, Documenta-
tion, The Original United States Supreme Court Judicial Database:  1953–2007 Terms, 
http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/sctdata.htm (select “Documentation” file format un-
der The Original U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database (nickname:  ALLCOURT) 
header, with analu = 0 and dec_type = 1, 6, or 7) (last visited Jan. 15, 2009). 
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of precedent—precedent that is decidedly liberal,80 such as Spinelli v. 
United States,81 Fullilove v. Klutznick,82 and Conley v. Gibson.83  If only one 
member of the Court had served on a federal circuit, the probability 
of repudiating a left-of-center (as opposed to conservative) precedent 
would have been about 0.14.84  When the number of Justices with 
prior service swells to five, the predicted probability that the Court 
overrules the lower court decision increases to 0.47.85
To conclude that a Court replete with appellate judges is more 
likely to override precedent, however, would be a mistake.  The results 
instead suggest that adherence to the principle of stare decisis has lit-
tle to do with the presence or absence of circuit court judges and far 
more to do with ideology; because roughly half of the Justices coming 
to the Court from the circuits were quite conservative,86 it is no sur-
prise to see the Court overturning liberal precedent. 
80
For this analysis we considered only previously decided cases that the Court 
overruled.  We coded the overruled precedent as liberal or conservative based on 
Spaeth’s “dir” variable (indicating whether a decision was liberal or conservative), su-
pra note 79.  We then estimated a logistic regression of the number of former federal 
appellate court judges on whether the Court overturned a liberal (coded 1) or conser-
vative (coded 0) precedent.  The coefficient on the number of former federal judges is 
+0.41 (with a standard error of .10), which tells us that a statistically significant rela-
tionship exists between the number of former federal judges and the Court’s propen-
sity to overturn liberal precedent.  The same result holds if we consider the number of 
all judges, state and federal. 
81
See 393 U.S. 410, 415 (1969) (laying out a strict standard for evaluating a finding 
of probable cause and rejecting a “totality of the circumstances” approach), overruled by
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
82
See 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1980) (describing a separate standard of review for 
Congress’s remedial use of racial and ethnic criteria), overruled by Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995). 
83
See 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (setting forth the rule that “a complaint should 
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to 
relief”), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1969 (2007). 
84
The 95% confidence interval is [0.05, 0.24]. 
85
The 95% confidence interval is [0.36, 0.57]. 
86
In our dataset are seventeen former federal circuit court judges:  Chief Justices 
Roberts and Burger; and Justices Alito, Blackmun, Breyer, Burger, Ginsburg, Harlan, 
Kennedy, Marshall, Minton, Scalia, Souter, Stevens, Stewart, Thomas, and Whittaker.  
Of these, eight (Roberts, Burger, Alito, Harlan, Minton, Scalia, Thomas, and 
Whittaker) were to the right of the median Justice for most, if not all, of their service 
on the Court.  We base this claim on Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn’s ideal point 
estimates. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Martin-Quinn Scores:  Measures, 
http://mqscores.wustl.edu/measures.php (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Mar-
tin-Quinn Scores].  See generally Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal 
Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 
POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002) (explaining the methodology behind the scores). 
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Figure 4:  Justices’ Votes on Overturning Precedent,  
1986–2000 Terms 
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Note:  This figure shows the percentage of cases in which a Justice  
voted to overturn a precedent when at least one other Justice  
stated his or her desire to overturn precedent (n = 45).   
* indicates a former federal appellate court judge. 
Further support for the importance of ideology, rather than judi-
cial experience, comes from analyses of the individual Justices’ behav-
ior.  To conduct these analyses, we considered all cases decided be-
tween the 1986 and 2000 terms in which at least one Justice (whether 
in the dissent or in the majority) advocated that the Court overturn 
precedent.87  We display the results in Figure 4. 
87
(n = 45).  Data are from JEFFREY A. SEGAL ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT IN THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 317 tbl.12-3 (2005).  See Cambridge Featured Titles:  The 
Supreme Court in the American Legal System, http://www.cambridge.org/ 
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As we can observe, no difference emerges between former circuit 
court judges and the others.  While Justices Stevens, Marshall, and 
Breyer—all with prior service on the circuits—were among the least 
likely to vote to overturn precedent, Justices Thomas and Scalia were 
among the most likely.  In about 80% of the cases, one or the other 
expressed the view that an existing precedent should be overturned, 
compared to 40% for Stevens, Marshall, and Breyer. 
That the left wing of the Court appears at the top of the chart and 
the conservatives at the bottom, regardless of circuit service, is hardly 
a coincidence.  Once again, it is ideology—the ideology of the Justice 
and of the ideological valence of the precedent—that is far more as-
sociated with the willingness to overturn precedent than judicial ex-
perience.  Figure 5 solidifies this point by showing, in the left panel, 
the percentage of cases in which the Justices voted to overturn (rather 
than uphold) liberal precedents, with the Justices ordered from left to 
right.  The right panel displays votes to overturn right-of-center 
precedents, with the Justices ordered from most conservative to most 
liberal.  Justices with asterisks served on a circuit court prior to their 
ascension to the Court. 
Beginning with the left panel, a clear linear pattern appears to 
emerge:  the more liberal the Justice, the lower the percentage of 
votes to overturn precedent, regardless of whether they were circuit 
court judges.  If prior experience served as a brake on their willing-
ness to overturn precedent, we should see Justices such as Scalia, 
Thomas, and Kennedy with very low percentages, but instead these 
three conservatives are at the very high end. 
us/features/0521785081/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2009), for the raw data sets Segal et al. 
used in creating their Table 12-3. 
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Figure 5:  Justices’ Votes on Overturning Liberal and  
Conservative Precedent, 1986–2000 Terms 
  20      40       60       80     100
                                 Percent Overturned 
Marshall*
Brennan
Stevens* 
Blackmun* 
Ginsburg* 
Breyer* 
Souter* 
Powell 
White
Kennedy*
O’Connor
Rehnquist
Scalia* 
Thomas* 
 20      40       60       80     100 
                   Conservative Precedent             Liberal Precedent
Note:  These figures show the percentage of cases in which a  
Justice voted to overturn a liberal (left panel) or conservative  
(right panel) precedent when at least one other Justice stated his  
or her desire to overturn precedent.  In both panels, the Justices  
are ordered on the basis of their ideology (in the left panel from  
most liberal to most conservative, and in the right panel from  
most conservative to most liberal).88  * indicates a former federal  
appellate court judge. 
88
To measure ideology, we use the mean (1986–2000 terms) of the Justices’ 
Martin-Quinn scores.  See Martin-Quinn Scores, supra note 86. 
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A statistical analysis, we hasten to note, confirms what our eyes tell 
us:  it is ideology and not federal judicial experience that explains the 
Justices’ willingness to overturn precedent.  To reach this conclusion, 
we regressed the percentage of votes to overturn liberal precedent 
cast by each Justice on a variable indicating whether the Justice had 
served in the circuits and on a measure of their ideology (i.e., their 
Martin-Quinn scores89).  Their service on the appellate court was not 
related, to a statistically significant degree, to their willingness to over-
turn liberal precedent; their ideology was.90  In concrete terms, as we 
move from the most liberal Justice (and former circuit judge) to the 
most conservative, the expected percent of overturning liberal prece-
dent increases from 5.5% to 88.4%. 
The story for overturning conservative precedent is somewhat 
more complicated.  Certainly, ideology matters:  note, for example, 
that Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens—the Justices least likely to over-
turn liberal precedent—are now three of the most likely to overturn 
conservative precedent.  Likewise, Thomas is one of the most likely to 
overturn liberal precedent but less likely to overturn conservative 
precedent. 
Statistical analyses again corroborate this relationship between 
ideology and overturning conservative precedent.91  But they also un-
earth another, perhaps more surprising result:  former circuit court 
judges are significantly more likely to overturn conservative precedent 
even after controlling for ideology.  Figure 5 provides some hint of 
this:  Rehnquist (who lacked federal judicial experience) is at the very 
low end and Kennedy (a circuit court judge for thirteen years) is at 
the very high.  More generally, our statistical model indicates that 
when we set ideology at its mean, the expected percentage of over-
turning conservative precedent for former circuit court judges is 76.6; 
for all others it is 57.9.92
89
See id.
90
The coefficient on whether the judge had served on a circuit is -11.82 (with a 
standard error of 7.29); on the Justices’ ideology it is 10.96 (with a standard error of 
1.67).
91
We estimated a logit model with the percentage of votes to overturn 
conservative precedent as the dependent variable, and both the Justices’ ideology and 
whether they had served as a federal circuit court judge as independent variables.  The 
coefficient on ideology is -6.41 (with a standard error of 1.93); on federal circuit court 
experience, it is 18.7 (8.43).  Both are statistically significant (p  0.05). 
92
The 95% confidence intervals are, respectively, [66.76, 86.41] and [44.66, 71.09]. 
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Because the total number of cases and Justices is quite small,93 we 
should interpret these results with caution.  Still, it is worth reiterating 
that whatever effects we have identified are far more consistent with 
Schmidhauser’s original finding than with conventional wisdom.  De-
pending on how we parse the data, former circuit court judges may be 
more willing to overturn precedent, as Schmidhauser concluded, but 
at the least they are no less willing to overturn precedent than their 
other colleagues. 
While this finding refutes the claim that former circuit court 
judges are more compelled to follow organizational norms such as 
stare decisis, it seems entirely explicable.  As Vicki Jackson,94 Judith 
Resnik,95 and others have noted, the practice of appointing Justices 
from the circuits may be creating “undesirable incentives”—incentives 
for appellate court judges to make decisions “with an eye to advance-
ment through necessarily political confirmation processes.”96  Surely, 
decisions regarding stare decisis fall into this category.  Were a circuit 
court judge to repeatedly (or even occasionally) refuse to adhere to 
precedent, she would be deemed unsuitable for a seat on the high 
Court.  With that knowledge, judges interested in promotion may be 
especially diligent in demonstrating the appropriate judicial tem-
perament by respecting the norm of stare decisis.  Once on the Su-
preme Court, however, such incentives vanish and the very same 
judges—now Justices—behave no differently from their other col-
leagues.
If Professors Jackson and Resnik are right, their account helps to 
solve two puzzles:  why some commentators continue to believe that 
Justices coming from the circuits will be more likely to respect prece-
dent and why those judges (once Justices) do not.  The belief reflects 
reality.  Appellate court judges who view their positions as “stepping 
stones” rather than “capstones”97 will be able to point to a judicial re-
93
These analyses include only the forty-five cases in which at least one Justice 
stated his or her desire to overturn precedent and only the fourteen Justices sitting be-
tween 1986 and 2000. 
94
See Jackson, supra note 10, at 984 (discussing the potential increase in tempta-
tion for self-interested decision making, especially when confirmation battles focus on 
ideology). 
95
See Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory:  Demand, Supply, and Life 
Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 609 (2005) (expressing concern that “the possibility 
of promotion may undercut the ability of judges to feel unfettered by personal interest 
when rendering judgments” (footnote omitted)). 
96
Jackson, supra note 10, at 983-84. 
97
Id. at 984. 
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cord of respect for precedent, as will their appointing President and 
supporters in the Senate.  But because that record has been built with 
an eye toward promotion—and not necessarily with regard for organ-
izational norms—different behavior once on the Supreme Court is 
not altogether surprising. 
2.  Ideology 
Respect for precedent is not the only purported advantage of ap-
pointing Justices with appellate court experience; another is that for-
mer judges will be less ideologically extreme in their decision making.  
The idea is that such nominees will have been socialized in the ways of 
judging, not politics—think John Harlan, not Earl Warren.  Or, as one 
commentator put it, 
[M]any [appellate court judges] are career jurists who have spent the 
greater part of their professional lives in relative isolation from thorny 
political controversies.  Still others may have seen their potentially 
controversial candidacies benefit from time spent on the appeals 
bench, where a judge’s formal responsibility is to temper his own 
personal opinions and interpret the law as United States Supreme Court 
precedents demand.
98
Regardless of the approach we take, we find little or no support 
for this proposition.  Consider, first, perceptions of the candidates’ 
political values at the time of their nomination.  To measure these, we 
again relied on Segal and Cover’s approach, which categorizes nomi-
nees as “unanimously liberal” (1) to “unanimously conservative” (0) 
based on newspaper editorials published before the Senate’s vote.99
Were it the case that former circuit court judges were viewed as less 
ideological, we should see them bunching up in the middle range of 
the measure, 0.50, not at the extremes.  As Figure 6 shows, however, 
this supposition does not hold. 
98
Yalof, supra note 32, at 697. 
99
Segal & Cover, supra note 36, at 559-60 ( justifying their methodology on the 
grounds that newspaper editorials can provide data with (1) ideological content, (2) 
comparable data, (3) independence from prior votes, and (4) no systematic errors); see 
also supra note 37, describing the procedures Segal and Cover used to categorize the 
qualifications of nominees.  They used the same approach to characterize the nomi-
nees’ ideology. 
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Figure 6:  Perceptions of the Nominees’ Ideology at the Time of 
Appointment, by Prior Service as a Federal Appellate Judge,  
from Hugo Black (1937) Through Samuel Alito (2006) 
Federal Appellate
 Judge 
Not a Federal 
Appellate Judge 
0.0       0.2        0.4       0.6      0.8       1.0 
       Perceived Ideology at Time of Nomination 
Note:  The dot shows the median and the boxes represent  
the interquartile range, which is the distance between the 25th 
percentile and the 75th percentile. 
Nominees who served as federal judges and all others are per-
ceived as equally ideological, though the judges were viewed as more 
conservative while the other candidates were viewed as more liberal.100
Both types are roughly equidistant from 0.50.  In addition, as the fig-
ure shows, the interquartile range for both groups is relatively simi-
100
For former federal judges the median perceived ideology at the time of 
nomination is 0.21; for those without prior service on the federal bench it is 0.73. 
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lar,101 suggesting that neither group is more dispersed than the other.  
Finally, in considering extremist nominees—those below the 25th 
percentile or above the 75th percentile (regardless of whether they 
are conservatives or liberals)—no significant difference emerges be-
tween those with or without prior federal judicial  
experience.102
What of the former appellate judges who make it to the Court?  
Are they less extreme in their decision making?  To assess this, we 
considered the percentage of left-of-center votes cast by all Justices 
during the 1953 to 2006 terms, with the goal of determining whether 
those without federal judicial experience were significantly more con-
servative or liberal than their colleagues with such experience.  Figure 
7 summarizes the results, and they indicate no substantial differences 
on this dimension.  Not only are the medians nearly identical for the 
nominees with and without former judicial experience (49.8% and 
47.9%, respectively) but, more importantly, the interquartile ranges 
are very similar (30.6% for those lacking judicial experience and 
23.4% for those with it).  In short, a federal judicial background sim-
ply “does not ensure similar or less ideological behavior.”103
Assuming that at least some of these former federal appellate 
court judges acted strategically, that is, with an eye toward promotion, 
our results once again seem quite explicable:  “the muzzle of federal 
judicial service might prevent incautious words that could later sink a 
nominee.”104  The path to a successful Supreme Court appointment, 
in other words, may counsel against extreme behavior—or at least 
against the position-taking behavior we expect of politicians.  But once 
on the Court, and the goal of promotion realized, that constraint ob-
viously becomes inoperative.105
101
The interquartile range is 0.58 for the former federal judges and 0.48 for the 
others. 
102
Under this definition, 60% of the former federal judges were extremists; the 
figure for those lacking federal judicial experience is 39.1%. 
103
Peretti, supra note 10, at 118. 
104
Samahon, supra note 9, at 816; see also Resnik, supra note 95, at 609 (“To the 
extent we value independent judges, unafraid of encountering popular disapproval 
and free from needing collegial approval, the possibility of promotion may undercut 
the ability of judges to feel unfettered by personal interest when rendering 
judgments.” (footnote omitted)). 
105
But see Segal & Cover, supra note 36 (showing that data on the perceptions of 
nominees is no better a predictor of ideology for lower court judges than for nominees 
coming from other walks of life).  This seems to suggest that “[ j]udges and scholars 
perpetuate the myth of merit.  The reality, however, is that every appointment is 
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Figure 7:  Liberal Voting of Supreme Court Justices, by Prior  
Service as a Federal Appellate Judge, 1953–2006 Terms 
  Federal Appellate Judge 
Not a Federal 
 Appellate Judge 
  30        40        50        60       70        80 
                Percent Liberal Votes 
Note:  The dot shows the median; the boxes represent the 
interquartile range, which is the distance between the 25th per-
centile and the 75th percentile. 
3.  Ultimate Legacy 
If nominees coming from the circuits are no more or less likely to 
take extreme positions in their decisions or to follow precedent, do 
they nonetheless make for superior Justices?  Whether owing to 
greater experience, expertise, or socialization, countless commenta-
tors have claimed that federal court judges do make superior nomi-
political.”  DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 34 (7th ed. 2005). 
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nees,106 or simply assume it to be true,107 but just as many systematic 
analyses refute it.108  In fact, perhaps because it represents something 
of an acid test for proponents of the norm of federal judicial experi-
ence, numerous scholars have tried but failed to establish a link be-
tween service in the circuits and judicial “greatness,” however defined. 
Consider Kosma’s study, which analyzed citations to the Justices’ 
opinions in an effort to discover their relative influence on the devel-
opment of the law.109  This study found that Justices who were private 
attorneys were significantly more influential than those coming from 
the bench.  Kosma observed that this finding is not especially suppor-
tive of the norm of federal judicial experience:  “Former judges as a 
class appear not to have been the most consistently influential of jus-
tices.  Especially given the similar backgrounds of most of the current 
members of the Supreme Court, these results argue in favor of 
broader consideration of private attorneys (and perhaps law profes-
sors) for upcoming appointments.”110
Other scholars, relying on surveys of law professors, historians, 
and social scientists, have reached much the same conclusion.  Walker 
and Hulbary found that Justices without judicial experience tended to 
receive higher marks from panels of experts than those with judicial 
experience.111  Using the same expert survey but more sophisticated 
methods, Caldeira similarly concluded that “[j]udicial experience, the 
sine qua non of quality for so many bar politicians and legislators, ex-
erts no influence on eminence.”112  More recently, Goldberg created a 
106
Cf. Suzanna Sherry, Logic Without Experience: The Problem of Federal Appellate 
Courts, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 97, 148-49 (2006) (extending the claim by arguing that 
the President should appoint more federal appellate court judges and Supreme Court 
Justices with service on a district court). 
107
See, e.g., Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV.
299, 300, 303 (2004) (proposing to subject federal judges to a tournament “where the 
reward to the winner is elevation to the Supreme Court,” using the “norm” of includ-
ing only federal appellate judges as the “starting point for the tournament”). 
108
See, e.g., Steven Goldberg, Federal Judges and the Heisman Trophy, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1237, 1238-43 (2005) (discussing the underrepresentation of former federal 
judges amongst consensus “great” Supreme Court Justices). 
109
Montgomery N. Kosma, Measuring the Influence of Supreme Court Justices, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 333 (1998). 
110
Id. at 370 (footnote omitted). 
111
See Thomas G. Walker & William E. Hulbary, Selection of Capable Justices:  Factors 
to Consider, in THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES 52, 66 (Albert P. Blaustein & Roy M. 
Mersky eds., 1978) (“[T]he group of justices with the highest performance scores were 
those that had no judicial service prior to assuming a position on the Court.”). 
112
Gregory A. Caldeira, In the Mirror of the Justices:  Sources of Greatness on the Supreme 
Court, 10 POL. BEHAV. 247, 258 (1988).  Using an updated version of the same data, 
866 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 833
master list containing the name of any Justice identified on one of 
eleven lists of leading Justices.113  His conclusion tracks Kosma’s, 
Walker and Hulbary’s, and Caldeira’s: 
 [W]hen you have ninety-nine Justices, twenty-four of whom were lower 
federal court judges, you might expect that the twenty-four would be 
reasonably well-represented in a long, composite list of great Justices.  
When you find only one of them on such a list, you begin to suspect that 
lower federal court judges are not the best group to study when you are 
trying to identify successful Justices.
114
Finally, a team of researchers at Washington University took much 
the same approach as Goldberg, analyzing sixteen lists of “great Jus-
tices” compiled by social scientists and law scholars.  They reached a 
similar conclusion:  “[I]f past presidents had limited their pool of 
nominees to appellate judges, they would have been limited to but six 
of the thirty-nine Justices [appearing on one or more list]—none of 
whom received ratings of ‘great’ by more than three experts.”115
In light of these existing studies of citation patterns and expert 
surveys—not to mention the uniformity of their results—we under-
took one additional analysis:  authorship of consequential decisions.  
Using a measure originally developed by David Mayhew116 and applied 
to the Court by Epstein and Segal,117 we considered whether former 
circuit court judges are more likely to write for the Court in especially 
important or salient cases.  The logic here is simple:  if the majority is 
about to hand down a decision of consequence and if former circuit 
court judges are in fact superior “craftsmen,” we should see these 
Robert C. Bradley, Who Are the Great Justices and What Criteria Did They Meet?, in GREAT 
JUSTICES OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 1, 9 (William D. Pederson & Norman W. 
Provizer eds., 2d prtg. 1993), did not need to update the conclusion:  “In considering 
future Court appointees, presidents should heed the message that prior judicial 
experience is not related, and is possibly an adverse influence, to superior Court 
performance.” 
113
Goldberg, supra note 108, at 1240-42. 
114
Id. at 1241. 
115
Workshop on Empirical Research on the Law (WERL), On Tournaments for 
Appointing Great Justices to the U.S. Supreme Court, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 157, 166 (2004). 
116
See DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING AND 
INVESTIGATIONS, 1946-2002, at 9 (2d ed. 2005) (measuring the relevance of congres-
sional investigations by whether an investigation was a front page story in the New York 
Times “on at least twenty days . . . during any Congress”). 
117
See Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66, 
72 (2000) (assessing media coverage to determine issue salience). 
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critical opinion assignments going their way.118  But the data belie the 
hypothesis.  Actually, in line with Kosma’s citation analyses and the 
expert judgment studies, our analysis suggests a significant relation-
ship between the lack of federal judicial experience and the produc-
tion of an important decision.119  That is, when the Court hands down 
a consequential decision, the probability that a former appellate court 
judge wrote it is only about 0.38, versus 0.62 for Justices that took 
other career paths.120
Why former circuit court judges do not perform especially well on 
any of these indicators—and, in fact, may even be inferior Justices 
relative to their other colleagues—is anyone’s guess.  Goldberg sug-
gests that “the jobs are different in many ways:  having the final say, 
always sitting en banc, the certiorari process, the political nature of 
many Supreme Court decisions, and many other variables may come 
into play.”121  Judge Harry T. Edwards of the D.C. Circuit concurs:  
“[T]he Supreme Court’s docket consists of many more ‘very hard’ 
cases. . . . The Supreme Court also faces the burden of having to sit en 
banc in every case.”122  It is beyond speculation, though, that our data 
suggest that Justice Frankfurter was correct when he famously (and 
defensively) noted, “without qualification . . . the correlation between 
118
The relationship could also work the other way:  when a superior craftsman 
writes, the opinion is more important.  To assess this, we use a model developed by Lee 
Epstein, Barry Friedman, and Nancy Staudt, On the Capacity of the Roberts Court to Gener-
ate Consequential Precedent, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1299, 1309-13 (2008), designed to predict 
the circumstances leading to a consequential decision (we exclude cases in which the 
number of participating former circuit court judges was 0 or 9).  Incorporating into 
this model a variable to indicate whether a former appellate court judge wrote the 
majority opinion leads to the same conclusion we discuss in the text:  majority opinions 
written by former appellate court judges are significantly less likely to result in 
important decisions than those written by other Justices.  Holding all other variables at 
their mean, when a former judge writes for the majority opinion, the odds are only 
0.12 (with a 95% confidence interval of [0.11, 0.14]) that it will result in an important 
decision; the figure increases to 0.18 [0.16, 0.19] for all other Justices. 
119
Specifically, we estimated a logistic regression, in which the dependent variable 
was whether or not the majority opinion was a former federal circuit court judge and 
the independent variable was whether the case was consequential or not, as measured 
by Epstein & Segal’s approach, supra note 117.  The coefficient on the independent 
variable is -0.47 (with a standard error of 0.07). 
120
The 95% confidence intervals are, respectively, [0.35, 0.41] and [0.59, 0.65]. 
121
Goldberg, supra note 108, at 1241-42 (citations omitted). 
122
Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA.
L. REV. 1639, 1644 (2003). 
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prior judicial experience and fitness for the functions of the Supreme 
Court is zero.”123
III. THE HOME COURT ADVANTAGE
Fifteen years ago, Lee Bollinger wrote, “I sense that, especially 
with the tendency exhibited over the past decades to give a high prior-
ity to prior judicial experience in making appointments to the bench, 
that we are heading towards a professionalized judiciary. . . . That . . . 
does not bode well for society.”124  Bollinger may have been more 
right than he knew.  If our analyses thus far suggest anything, it is that 
the advantages attributed to the norm of federal judicial experience 
lack evidentiary support.  Actually, a serious downside already seems 
to have emerged:  far from providing an objective evaluation of “judi-
cial temperament and craftsmanship through the nominee’s past ju-
dicial experience,”125 the experiential norm may be providing evalua-
tors with misinformation.  Because “[t]he chance for promotion . . . is 
likely sufficient to induce behavior by lower court judges that they 
view as enhancing their chances for promotion,”126 we are likely to get 
only a partial picture of the Justice who will eventually emerge on the 
Court.
But this is not the only potential downside.  Another possibility 
centers on what we call “circuit effects.”  The general idea is that when 
former federal judges come to the Court, they may be favorably (or 
even unfavorably) predisposed to the U.S. courts of appeals generally 
or toward their former circuits in particular.  Either way, if circuit ef-
fects exist we might expect to find the judges-turned-Justices affirming 
(or reversing) more frequently than they otherwise would. 
This is not a new idea, of course.  Several scholars have discussed 
the possibility of such effects, though typically in the context of trial 
court judges promoted to the appellate courts.  In his recent book, 
How Judges Think, Judge Richard Posner opines that, “Appellate judges 
promoted from the trial court may be more likely than other appellate 
judges to vote to affirm a trial judge.  They are more sensitive to the 
123
Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PA. L. REV.
781, 795 (1957). 
124
Lee C. Bollinger, The Mind in the Major American Law School, 91 MICH. L. REV.
2167, 2176 (1993). 
125
Jackson, supra note 10, at 983. 
126
Kevin M. Scott, Understanding Judicial Hierarchy:  Reversals and the Behavior of 
Intermediate Appellate Judges, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 163, 170 (2006). 
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advantages that the trial judge has over the appellate court in gaining 
a deep understanding of a case . . . .”127  A more recent paper by Nick 
Linder and John Dorsett Niles partially confirms Posner’s intuition.128
Based on an analysis of criminal-sentencing cases that came before the 
Ninth Circuit between 2003 and 2007, these researchers found that 
circuit court judges with prior experience as a state trial judge are sig-
nificantly more likely to affirm decisions below.129
This is a general type of bias.  For former appellate court judges 
sitting on the Supreme Court, another type of bias is possible:  differ-
ential treatment of decisions coming out of each Justice’s former cir-
cuit versus all other circuits.  While appellate court judges with trial 
court experience receive cases only from districts within their circuits, 
former appellate court judges sitting on the Supreme Court hear cases 
from all circuits.  Having worked with judges on their circuit for 
months, years, or even decades, it is entirely possible that Justices will 
have developed some attachment to their “home team” rather than to 
all circuits generally.  No doubt, to provide one example, Justice Alito 
occasionally clashed with his former colleagues on the Third Circuit.  
Yet, seven of them, assembled by Alito’s “longtime friend” Judge Ed-
ward Becker,130 testified on Alito’s behalf despite the obvious conflict 
of interest—an interest in retaining “warm ties with a Supreme Court 
justice able to rule on their decisions that are appealed to the nation’s 
highest court.”131  As one commentator noted, testimony of this sort 
was “extraordinary . . . for . . . sitting judges who will be dealing with a 
127
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 74 (2008). 
128
Nick Linder & John Dorsett Niles, The Effect of Trial-Judge Experience on 
Appellate Decisionmaking Behavior (Apr. 25, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1126655 (empirically analyzing the relative 
likelihood of former state and federal trial judges affirming trial court decisions 
following promotion to a federal circuit court). 
129
See id. at 33 (attributing such tendencies to state judges’ familiarity with the 
trial court’s advantage of hearing evidence directly).  But Linder and Niles also find 
that prior experience as a federal trial judge does not have a statistically significant 
effect on decisions to reverse or affirm lower court rulings.  Id.
130
Charles Babington, Sitting Judges to Speak on Alito’s Behalf, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 
2006, at A5. 
131
Id. The possibility of ethical violations was also raised.  Democrats on the 
Senate Judiciary Committee asserted that the judges, if allowed to testify, would be in 
violation of Canon 2B of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.  Editors at the New 
York Times and other commentators echoed the Democrats’ concern.  See Editorial, 
Fairness in the Alito Hearings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, at A28 (“It is extraordinary for 
judges to thrust themselves into a controversial Supreme Court nomination in this way, 
a move that could reasonably be construed as a partisan gesture.  The judges will be 
doing harm to the federal bench.”). 
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colleague who could be positioned to uphold or overturn their rul-
ings.”132
In the case of Justice Alito, we might expect a positive circuit ef-
fect toward his former colleagues, but it is entirely possible that such 
an effect does not always work to the advantage of the home circuit.  
In fact, given the infamously bad relations between some Supreme 
Court Justices and their former colleagues—Justice Burger’s clashes 
with liberals on the D.C. Circuit are notorious133—they may even work 
to the disadvantage of those courts. 
In what follows, we explore the two forms of circuit effects:  a gen-
eral bias towards the circuits and more specific biases toward the 
home courts.  We find no evidence of the former, but attachments to 
the Justices’ former circuits are quite substantial. 
A.  Bias Toward the Circuit Court 
As a general matter and regardless of their career path, circuit 
court judges tend to affirm lower court decisions.134  Precisely the 
opposite holds for Supreme Court Justices. 
Figure 8, which depicts the Justices’ reversal rates, underscores the 
point.135  With but two exceptions, Whittaker and Marshall,136 all 
Justices sitting since 1953 voted to reverse more often than not.  This 
holds for Justices as ideologically diverse as Fortas and Goldberg on 
the left, Powell and O’Connor in the middle, and Rehnquist and 
Scalia on the right; and it holds for the Court’s newest members, Alito 
and Roberts, neither of whom shows any indication of breaking with 
the long-standing tradition of reversal.  Even more to the point, the 
reversal trend holds for Justices with federal judicial experience and 
those without it. While the former are less likely to reverse (0.59 versus 
0.64), the difference is not statistically significant. 
132
Babington, supra note 130, at A5. 
133
See, e.g., LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 23-24 (2005) 
(noting that when Burger joined the D.C. Circuit, he “threw himself into the 
ideological combat.  His nemesis was the equally combative [ Judge David] Bazelon”) 
134
For an interesting analysis of the propensity of these courts to reverse, see 
FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007), analyzing 
the statistical effects that an array of factors have on circuit court judges’ decisions. 
135
Data are from Spaeth, supra note 79. 
136
Their reversal rates, respectively, are 0.48 and 0.49. 
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Figure 8:  Justices’ Reversal Rates on Cases Coming from the  
U.S. Courts of Appeals 
Whittaker*
Marshall*
Harlan*
Stevens*
Brennan
Blackmun*
Ginsburg*
Stewart*
Thomas*
Souter*
Scalia*
Kennedy*
Breyer*
O’Connor
White
Powell
Rehnquist
Burger*
Warren
Alito*
Fortas
Goldberg
Roberts*
0.50         0.55         0.60         0.65         0.70          0.75     
    Proportion of Circuit Court Decisions Reversed
Note:  The thin vertical line indicates the mean reversal rate.  The 
data are for Justices starting their service on the Court since 1953 
and include only cases that were orally argued.  * indicates former 
circuit court judges. 
Why this regularity persists across time and areas of the law is not 
especially difficult to explain.  Under most theories of judging on the 
Supreme Court, “reversal” is the more plausible forecast.  Scholars 
who study the hierarchy of justice, for example, have noted that the 
threat of reversal is the only sanction available to Supreme Court Jus-
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tices against errant circuit courts.  Were the Justices to affirm all their 
decisions, the threat would lose its credibility.137
The patterns become somewhat more interesting when we com-
pare the treatment of cases coming to the Supreme Court from the 
circuits with those coming from all other courts (primarily state courts 
of last resort), while controlling for the ideological direction of the 
lower court’s decision (either liberal or conservative).  Under Judge 
Posner’s logic, we might expect former circuit court judges to show a 
greater willingness to affirm appellate court rulings regardless of 
whether the decision below was left or right of center.  In order to ex-
amine the factors affecting whether Justices voted to affirm the court 
below, we ran logistic regressions for each Justice on the type of court 
that had its ruling under review (federal appellate or another) and 
the ideological direction of the decision (liberal or conservative).  The 
regressions show that for all but three of the Justices (Burton, Minton, 
and Reed), the ideological direction of the decision below was statisti-
cally significant.138  Put simply, regardless of whether the ruling comes 
from a state or federal court, liberal Justices vote to reverse conserva-
tive decisions and conservative Justices vote to reverse liberal deci-
sions.  Justices Alito and Ginsburg provide useful examples.  If the de-
cision of a circuit court is conservative, the probability that Alito will 
cast a vote to reverse is about 0.50;139 when it is a liberal decision, that 
figure jumps to nearly 0.80.140  Conversely, Ginsburg votes to reverse 
seven out of every ten conservative decisions coming before the Court 
but only five out of every ten liberal decisions.141
Given the vast literature on the subject, ideological decision mak-
ing of this sort is no surprise.  Much more surprising, in light of the 
Posner hypothesis, is that only four of the sixteen former circuit court 
137
Analysts focusing on the internal calculations of the Justices reach a similar 
conclusion.  They show that Justices who agree with the lower court’s decision are 
better off denying certiorari.  If they vote to grant and the Court ultimately reverses, 
the cost is substantial:  the establishment of unfavorable precedent across all the 
circuits.  But if they vote to deny certiorari, “there [is] a small but certain gain.”  JAN 
PALMER, THE VINSON COURT ERA 59 (1990).  That is, they can be assured that at least 
one circuit will maintain favorable precedent.  Now consider a Justice who disagrees 
with the lower court’s decision.  “[T]here [is] a small but certain loss from denying 
cert.  Thus, justices [are] more likely to vote to grant when they want[] to reverse the 
lower court.” Id.
138
The results of the regressions are available at http://epstein.law.northwestern. 
edu/research/circuiteffects.htm.
139
The prediction is 0.53 with a 95% confidence interval of [0.39, 0.68]. 
140
The prediction is 0.78 with a 95% confidence interval of [0.68, 0.89]. 
141
The predictions are 0.68 [0.64, 0.72] versus 0.50 [0.45, 0.54]. 
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judges show any bias toward the circuits—relative to the state supreme 
courts—and for two, Scalia and Thomas, the bias works against the 
circuits.142  That is, Justices Scalia and Thomas are significantly more 
likely to reverse a decision from the circuits than a comparable deci-
sion from the state courts—though the effect itself is reasonably small.  
Based on our estimates, Thomas, for example, reverses roughly four 
out of every ten conservative decisions coming from the circuits; that 
figure is closer to three out of every ten decisions coming from the 
states.143  On the other hand, five of the fifteen Justices without prior 
federal appellate experience exhibit some favoritism toward the cir-
cuits over all other courts, even after controlling for the ideological 
direction of the lower court decision:  Justices Brennan, Clark, Doug-
las, Reed, and Powell. 
B.  Bias Toward the Home-Court Circuit 
While Justices Scalia, Thomas, and most of the others with appel-
late court experience show no favoritism toward the U.S. courts of ap-
peals as a collective, a wholly different picture emerges when we focus 
on their former home courts.  With only a few exceptions, Justices 
who served on the circuits behave in a significantly different manner 
toward their former court relative to all others. 
Figure 9 vividly illustrates this point.  There we depict the thirteen 
former appellate court judges appointed to the Supreme Court since 
1953,144 along with a comparison of their reversal rates for the circuit 
on which they served against all other circuits.  Note that for three Jus-
tices—Blackmun, Souter, and Stewart—the difference appears rather 
negligible.  For the other ten Justices, however, a statistically signifi-
cant difference emerges between the treatment of their former circuit 
and of the other appellate courts.145
142
Justices Blackmun and Marshall were favorably and significantly biased toward 
the circuits. 
143
The predictions are 0.41 [0.37, 0.45] versus 0.34 [0.28, 0.40]. 
144
Due to an insufficient number of cases from their home circuits, we exclude 
Justice Alito (n = 1) and Chief Justice Roberts (n = 1). 
145
In this analysis, which does not control for the ideological direction of the 
circuit court’s decision, Justice Stevens’s behavior toward his former circuit and all 
others is statistically indistiguishable.  Including the control for the ideological 
direction of the decision, he is positively biased toward his circuit, (p = 0.54). 
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Figure 9:  Justices’ Reversal Rates on Cases Coming from the  
U.S. Courts of Appeals on Which They Served and All Others 
All Other Circuits  
Their Own Circuit 
     0.2                 0.4              0.6               0.8      
                   Proportion Reversed 
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Note:  The data are for Justices starting their service on the Court  
since 1953; Justices Alito and Roberts are excluded for insufficient   
cases.  * indicates a statistically significant difference between the  
Justice’s treatment of cases coming from his or her former circuit  
court and of cases from all other circuits. 
For eight of the ten Justices, the relationship is positive, meaning 
that they favored their former circuit (note that the crosses in Figure 9 
are to the left of the circles).  Take Ruth Bader Ginsburg, for exam-
ple.  Looking across all of the 946 decisions coming out of the U.S. 
courts of appeals that were reviewed by the Supreme Court since she 
joined the Court in 1994, Justice Ginsburg voted to affirm in about 
40% and voted to reverse in 60%.  The figures for the D.C. Circuit, 
where she served between 1980 and 1993 are nearly the mirror image:  
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Justice Ginsburg voted to affirm in 58% and to reverse in 42%.  Like-
wise, over the course of his career Justice Thurgood Marshall voted to 
reverse federal appellate court decisions about as often as he voted to 
affirm them—except when it came to his former court, the Second 
Circuit.  He voted to affirm more than six out of every ten cases com-
ing from the Second Circuit.146  Then there is Charles Whittaker, who 
formerly sat on the Eighth Circuit.  In only one of the dozen cases 
coming from the Eighth Circuit did he vote to reverse his former col-
leagues, though his overall reversal rate was about 50%.  
For two of the ten Justices, the relationship is negative—meaning 
they were systematically biased against their circuit.  That Chief Justice 
Burger was more inclined to vote to affirm decisions coming out of all 
other circuits relative to his former home is not surprising.  As men-
tioned, he had a famously poor relationship with Judge Bazelon.  Jus-
tice Kennedy, however, is a bit more of a puzzle.  We know of no ac-
counts claiming that his relationship with colleagues on the Ninth 
Circuit was anything but cordial.  On the other hand, he was a rela-
tively conservative jurist on a relatively liberal circuit—naturally raising 
the possibility that the effect depicted in Figure 9 is less about a bias 
toward specific courts and more about ideology. 
Nonetheless, even after controlling for the ideological direction of 
the lower court decision, the basic patterns displayed in Figure 9 re-
main.  Of the thirteen Justices with federal judicial experience, only 
Justices Stewart, Souter, and Blackmun show no bias toward the for-
mer circuits; Justices Burger and Kennedy are significantly less favora-
bly disposed to their home court; and the others are significantly 
more favorably disposed.  Moreover, the size of the effect is nontrivial, 
as we show in Figure 10.  Consider Justice Breyer:  If the First Circuit 
were to reach a decision favoring, say, the defendant in a criminal case 
or a plaintiff in an employment discrimination suit, the likelihood of 
Justice Breyer—a former member of that court—casting a vote to af-
firm is very high at p = 0.69.147  However, if a similar case were to come 
from another circuit, the odds that he would vote to affirm fall to well 
below p = 0.50. 
146
Of the 254 cases coming from the Second Circuit, Justice Marshall voted to 
affirm in 162, or 64%. 
147
The 95% confidence interval is [0.48, 0.91]. 
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Figure 10:  Predicted Probability of the Justices Voting to Reverse 
Decisions Coming from Their Former Circuit  
and All Other Circuits 
    All Other Circuits   
Their Former Circuit  
Breyer* 
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Thomas* 
Ginsburg* 
Scalia* 
Marshall*
Harlan* 
Stevens* 
Blackmun 
Stewart
Souter 
Burger* 
Kennedy*
0.2                 0.4               0.6        
         Proportion Reversed 
Note:  The Justices are ordered by the absolute distance between 
the predicted probability of them voting to reverse decisions from 
their former circuit and the predicted probability of them voting 
to reverse decisions from all other circuits.  The data are for 
Justices starting their service on the Court since 1953.  Justices 
Alito and Roberts are excluded due to insufficient cases from their 
home circuits. 
 * indicates a statistically significant difference between the 
Justice’s treatment of cases coming from his or her former circuit 
court and of cases coming from all other circuits, controlling for 
the ideological direction of the lower court decision.  For all 
Justices, we computed the predicted probabilities for voting to 
reverse a conservative decision from the court below. 
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Even more interesting, perhaps, are the cases of Justices Clarence 
Thomas and Antonin Scalia.  As the analyses above indicate, both are 
significantly more likely to affirm decisions of state courts than the 
circuits; this is not so when it comes to their former home, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.  For cases in which the 
D.C. Circuit reached a conservative decision, the likelihood of Tho-
mas casting a vote to reverse is only 0.20; for similarly conservative de-
cisions coming out of all other circuits, the figure more than doubles, 
at 0.44.  We can say the same of Justice Scalia—and, for that matter, 
another former member of the D.C. Circuit, Justice Ginsburg (see 
Figure 10).  In fact, affirming decisions from their home court may be 
one of the few proclivities shared by Scalia and Thomas, on one side 
of the ideological spectrum, and Ginsburg, on the other. 
CONCLUSION
From this analysis and all those preceding it, a clear conclusion 
emerges:  the benefits of drawing Supreme Court Justices from the 
federal circuits are, at best, overstated, while the costs are, at mini-
mum, understated.  An obvious antidote is for the President to look to 
other pools for potential Court candidates.  If confirmation is viewed 
as an important consideration, one can now feel reasonably certain 
that sitting federal judges are no less likely to face contentious pro-
ceedings than any other candidate; indeed, sitting judges may actually 
be more difficult to confirm.  And if making high-quality appoint-
ments is a relevant criterion, the President can now legitimately claim 
that previous federal judicial experience is no guarantee that the can-
didate, as a Justice, will be more likely to follow precedent and less 
likely to follow his or her own political values, or even to go down in 
the annals as one of the “greats.” 
A less obvious, though no less plausible, remedy would be for ap-
pointers to work toward greater representation of the circuits on the 
Supreme Court.  Arlen Specter implicitly made this point in response 
to conflict-of-interest concerns that were raised when Justice Alito’s 
colleagues from the Third Circuit testified on his behalf.  No one 
should worry that Alito would be predisposed toward affirming the 
Third Circuit’s rulings, Specter declared, because, “if confirmed, 
[Alito] would be one of nine people reviewing their cases.”148
148
Babington, supra note 130. 
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This is true for the Third Circuit:  Alito is the first and only Justice 
elevated from that court.  It does not, however, hold for the First 
Circuit, on which two current Justices served (Souter and Breyer), nor 
for the D.C. Circuit, now with four representatives on the Supreme 
Court.  In fact, our recommendation of greater diversity in circuit 
court representation follows from the D.C. Circuit’s disproportionate 
presence on the current Court.  Put simply, with its current status as 
something of a training camp for Supreme Court Justices, the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia is now at a considerable 
advantage relative to the other eleven circuits. 
Figure 11, which depicts the predicted probability of the Justices 
reversing the D.C. Circuit and all others, shows as much.  Note the 
D.C. Circuit’s change in fortune over time.  During the 1950s, 1960s, 
and 1970s, when no more than one Justice had served there (Burger), 
the Supreme Court was significantly more likely to reverse the 
decisions of the D.C. Circuit than than those coming from all other 
circuits, even after controlling for the ideology of the Court and the 
ideological direction of the lower court decision.149  A D.C. Circuit 
decision had 0.79 likelihood of reversal during the Burger years—a 
figure substantially higher than 0.63, the probability of reversal for all 
other circuits during this time.  By the 1994 term (after Justice 
Ginsburg joined her former colleagues, Justices Scalia and Thomas) 
and into the Roberts Court years, the situation reversed itself.  A 
statistically significant difference remains between the D.C. Circuit 
and all other circuits, but it now works to the D.C. Circuit’s advantage.  
While all other circuits face a reasonably high probability of reversal 
(0.62), the D.C. Circuit actually faces a higher probability of 
affirmance (0.41 reversal rate). 
149
Along with an interaction of ideology and lower court direction. 
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Figure 11:  Predicted Probability of Reversal for the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia and All Other Circuits 
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Note: Warren = 1953–1968 terms; Burger = 1969–1985 terms; 
Rehnquist I = 1986–1993 terms; Rehnquist/Roberts = 1994–2006 
terms.  The capped vertical lines show 95% confidence intervals.  
The predicted probability for each era is based on a logit model 
that takes into account whether the appeal was from the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia or another circuit, 
the ideological direction of the lower court decision, the median’s 
ideology, and an interaction between the two.  The predicted 
probability displayed in the figure is based on a conservative lower 
court decision, with all other variables set at their mean.  The 
coefficient on the U.S. courts of appeals variable is statistically 
significant in all models except Rehnquist I. 
If we assume that systematic bias is undesirable in any court, 
neutralizing it will require appointers to look toward other, 
unrepresented circuits for the next few appointees.  Doing so should 
not be difficult.  For most of the nation’s history, geographic diversity 
was a strong norm—perhaps as strong as the norm of judicial 
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experience is now.150  If a Supreme Court Justice from the East 
resigned, the President nominated an easterner; if a southerner 
departed, the President looked to the South for a replacement.  
Ensuring greater representation of the circuits should be no more 
difficult; with little doubt, credible Democratic and Republican 
candidates reside in each.  More to the point, all politicians involved 
in the appointments process should want to take this approach.  With 
the exception of the northeastern corridor, the home team advantage 
now so apparent on the nation’s high court may well be 
disadvantaging appellants from all parts of the country. Senators 
serving in the first Congress would have found this intolerable and it is 
hard to imagine today’s legislators—given their own reelection 
concerns—finding it any less so. 
150
See, e.g., BARBARA A. PERRY, A “REPRESENTATIVE” SUPREME COURT? 5-6 (1991) 
(“Presidents were particularly scrupulous in maintaining a balance among the coun-
try’s regions prior to the Civil War.”); Amar, supra note 3, at 472 (discussing the impor-
tance of geographical concerns for the founders in differentiating between the juris-
diction of the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts); Hatch, supra note 3, at 
1351-52 (describing how nominations during the Reconstruction Era “were considered 
political patronage and were allocated according to geographic considerations”). 
